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1. Pension and Other Contractual Saving
Some recent studies of saving find that contractual and discretionary
saving are substitutes for each but give widely differing esti-
mates of the rate of substitution, in part because of small samples that
entail large ranges of error. For verification of their results, let us look
at the Consumers Union sample and, at the same time, compare the
behavior of pension with other contractual saving.
Table 4 gives, for households covered and not covered by group
pensions,2 the average ratios for various kinds of saving and rates of
substitution between them. The table makes the exclusions outlined
in the preceding chapter, except that the top two rows include house-
holds with extreme saving ratios and the bottom two exclude them.
In addition, the third row excludes nineteen households with pension
1SeeJ. Morgan, "Factors Related to Consumer Saving When It Is Defined as a
Net-Worth Concept," in Contributions of Survey Methods to Economics (L. Klein,
ed.), New York, 1954, p. 135; L. Klein, "The British. Propensity to Save," Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Part 1, 1958, pp. 60—96; and I. Friend and
R. Jones, "The Concept of Saving," in Consumption and Saving (Friend and Jones,
eds.), University of Pennsylvania, 1960, II, 336—359.
On the other hand, the following studies find no clear evidence of substitution.
Preliminary results of work by the Survey Research Center show increased saving by
people under private pension plans (G. Katona, "Saving for Retirement," The Out-
look on Consumer Behavior [C. Lininger, ed.], Foundation for Research on Human
Behavior, 1964, pp. 103—121). An unpublished Oxford dissertation by N. Liviatan
compares saving via British superannuation schemes with other saving and finds
little or no substitution. A Swedish study brought to my attention by Thomas
Mayer reports a large increase in total saving for households under pension plans
(Hushá liens Sjbarande Ar 1955 [Household Savings in the Year 1955], Vol. I, Medde-
landen Fran Konj unkturinstitu tet, Stockholm, 1959).
2Determinedby whether respondents answered any part of question 15 (see Ap-
pendix). No attempt was made to correct for households not covered in their present
jobs but who reported themselves as covered because they received pension benefits






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































—22 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
saving ratios over 49 per cent who probably reported erroneously. The
exclusion of extreme ratios affects the size of the figures but not the
direction of effects in which we are interested. As argued in Chapter
2,this exclusion seems appropriate, and we may assume that the
bottom two rows give the more reliable estimates. For these, the last
column shows that discretionary saving is less by 73 and 77 cents for
every dollar of other contractual saving, which is in line with other
studies. The covered and not-covered households do not have ma-
terially different rates. The next two columns show, however, that
pension contributions have quite different effects. For every dollar of
such contributions there is 21 cents more of discretionary and 28 cents
more of other contractual saving; these rates differ from zero at the
.05 level of statistical significance.
A positive rate is confirmed by the higher average ratios for covered
than for not-covered households: the former save more in total and do
so by more than the amount of their pension contributions. There is,
to be sure, a minor inconsistency between the rates and the average
ratios. By the regression equation, the rates for covered households in
the third row imply that pension contributions of 2.8 per cent of in-
come increase other contractual saving by (2.8 X .28) 0.8 percentage
points, whereas the actual increase over the not-covered households in
the fourth row is only 0.2 points. On the other hand, the rates and
averages for covered households imply an increase in discretionary
saving of (2.8 x.21+ 2.8 x[1—.73]x.28)0.8 percentage points, and
the actual increase over the not-covered households is 0.7 points. Some
discrepancy is not surprising; there are bound to be random variations
in the data, particularly in the average ratios for not-covered house-
holds, which number only about a quarter of our sample. Another
reason for inconsistency may be that the effect of pension on other
saving is not linear, contrary to the assumption implicit in these re-
gressions. Evidence of nonlinearity is presented in Chapter 4.
Pension saving reported by households is likely to be inaccurate,
since many respondents may be uncertain about the amount of their
own contribution and probably have only the haziest notion of their
The average pension contribution of 2.8 per cent of in-
come seems far too low compared with our separate estimate of it
a Most industrial plans have fixed benefits, but do not specify the amount of con-
tributions by employers. The plan for many college teachers is atypical in havingSaving Ratios Compared 23
(see Chapter 4, Section 2) and other information. Over two-thirds of
the respondents either made no estimate of the change in pension
equity or reported that their estimate included no part of the em-
ployer's contribution. Of those that made no estimate, the majority
had noncontributory plans. Nonetheless, these data give the respond-
ents' understanding of what their pension saving is. From this point
of view, the results indicate that coverage does not lead households to
substitute their pension contributions for other forms of saving, but
seems actually to induce a slight increase in other saving. If so, aggre-
gate personal saving is increased by the amount of growth in pension
funds and apparently also by a small amount of increased saving by
covered households in other forms. Such results suggest one reason why
other studies obtained wide-ranging estimates of the rate of substitu-
tion between discretionary and contractual saving: they have included
in the latter a large and variable item—pension contributions—that has
a quite different rate.
An immediate objection to these results is their neglect of social
security coverage (OASDI). Eligible households will take anticipated
social security benefits into account in their retirement plans. It is
possible that a greater fraction of the no-pension group is under
OASDI, taxes for which are excluded from these saving figures. This
neglect is relevant to our sample: social security covers about 80 per
cent of the pension group and about 94 per cent of the no-pension
group (in part because the former includes a large group of govern-
ment workers who are not covered by social security). The pension
group may save more in other forms only because a larger fraction
does not have social security, and this possibility can be checked by
excluding households that are not so covered. The relevant figures are
presented in Table 5 for the reduced sample of households covered by
a pension in the third row of Table 4. The corresponding figures for
the no-pension group are not shown because that group is almost
entirely covered by social security.
The rates of substitution in Table 5 follow the pattern in the pre-
stated contributions by both employee and employer, up to half of which may be
paid into a variable annuity, CREF, the rest to a fixed-dollar annuity, TIAA. Pen-
sion payments from CREF are determined by the investment experience ofits




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Saving Ratios Compared 25
ceding table: negative for the effect of other contractual saving on
discretionary saving and significantly positive for the effect of pension
saving on discretionary and other contractual saving. The households
with OASDI even show the positive effect of pension saving more
strongly, though the differences between the estimated rates for the two
groups may well reflect random variability.
The discretionary saving ratio and the rates of substitution for
pension saving are higher for the households with OASDI than with-
out, which seems to imply that social security coverage leads to greater
saving in other forms, just as we find for pension saving. Such an effect
is often attributed to social security, but it cannot be inferred from our
data. Most of the households in our sample without OASDI work for
governmental agencies (including teachers in public education). All
that the comparison in the first column of Table S shows is that gov-
workers save less in discretionary forms than others do, which
may be due to their lack of social security or to some other common
characteristic. (One is suggested in Chapter 4, Section 1.) Also, in gov-
ernment the workers make about one half of the total contribution to
their plans, which is uncommonly high and explains why the pension
saving ratio is higher in the second than in the first row of Table 5 if,
as seems likely, employers' contributions were typically not reported.
This occupational distortion in the sample of the effect of social
security coverage does not apply to our interpretation of pension sav-
ing, and we may conclude that this kind of saving is associated with a
slight increase in other saving and that this is not due to differences in
social security coverage. The next step is to check the data for other
possible distortions and, if none is found, to see what explanation can
be adduced for this association.
2. Adjustment for Age and Income
Pension saving as reported is, as has been noted, suspect because of its
uncertain meaning and accuracy. For the remainder of this chapter,
let us disregard the reported pension contribution in question 14
altogether and look only at total other saving, which excludes it. The
preceding results can be checked by comparing the other saving ratios
of households divided into covered and not-covered groups. Table 4
has shown that covered households save more than not-covered house-26 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
holds in addition to pension contributions—0.7 percentage points more
in discretionary savingand 0.2 more in contractual saving, or 0.9
more in total, according to the averages in the bottom two rows of the
table. (The increase in contractual saving indicates that pension saving
does not substitute for saving via life insurance, which seems a priori
to be the closest substitute.) The range of error of this total difference
between the two groups is ±0.6 at the .05 level, so it is statistically
significant despite its small amount. We need, however, to check for
possible biases.
One possibility is that the heads of the covered households are likely
to be older and better-paid workers. This, combined with the tendency
of saving ratios to rise with age, might explain the greater saving of
the covered group. In addition, though higher-income groups do not
necessarily save proportionately more, they might. One way to adjust
for age and income is to compare households in each age (according to
head) and income class separately. This procedure leads to comparisons
between small subclasses of the sa.mple, however, and so increases the
errors of estimation. The same purpose can be achieved with a three-
way analysis of variance, which is equivalent to estimating the average
difference in saving ratios between the various age and income classes,
adjusting the ratios for these differences, and then finding the average
difference in these adjusted ratios between the covered and not-covered
groups.5
4Cashsaving (thatis, "checking and saving accounts, government bonds")is
responsible for all the difference in discretionary saving. The breakdown for the
bottom two rows of Table 4 is as follows:
Saving Ratios (per cent)
Total
Cash SecuritiesDiscretionary
Covered 2.08 0.69 2.77
Not covered 1.28 0.78 2.06
Difference of covered over not-covered
group 0.80 —0.09 0.71
5Themethod is equivalent to fitting the following regression equation to the data
by least squares:
S/Y =k+ (a1 —a2)A1+ (a3 —a2)A3+ ...+(a6 —a2)A6
+(y1 — +(y2 — + (y4 — y3)Y4+ •..+(y7 —y3)Y7
÷ (c1 —c2)C
where S/Y is the ratio of total other saving to income, andis unity if the house-Saving Ratios Compared 27
The analysis of variance simplifies interpretation of the results by
giving one estimate of the effect of pension coverage based on the full
sample. It has the minor drawback of assuming no interaction effects
between age and income (that is, that the effect of age on the saving
ratio does not depend on the income class nor the effect of income on
the age class). Such interactions are not likely to be important, at least
compared with those between pension coverage and the age or income
class (discussed later). This method has the advantage over standard
multiple regressions of not assuming any particular functional form for
the effect of age and income.
Table 6 gives the results of this three-way analysis of variance for
the full sample and the middle age and income classes separately.
Corrections for any two age or any two incom.e classes show the mean
difference between the two classes standardized for the effects of the
other regression variables. As they stand, the figures give standardized
mean differences between each class and the arbitrarily selected stand-
ard class (25—49 for age 6and$5,000—$7,500 for income). That is, the
estimated saving ratio for not-covered households age 25—49 and in-
come $5,000—$7,500 is the constant term (given at end of footnote 5).
The estimated ratio for any other class is found by adding the appro-
priate correction factors. Most of the factors are statistically significant.
The effect of pension coverage standardized for age and income is
hold is in the ith age class and zero otherwise,is unity if the household is in the
ith income class and zero otherwise, C is unity if the household is covered by a
pension fund and zero otherwise, and the small letters are regression coefficients with
the following interpretation:
—a2is the difference in average saving ratios between the ith and 2nd age
classes (the latter being arbitrarily selected as the standard age class) standardized
for income and pension coverage, Yj — isthe difference in average saving ratios
between the ith and 3rd income classes (the latter being arbitrarily selected as the
standard income class) standardized for age and pension coverage, c1— c2isthe
difference in average saving ratios between the covered (c1) and not-covered (c2)
householdsstandardized for age and income, and k is the mean ratio for not-covered
households in the 2nd age class and 3rd income class. In the regressions of Table 6,
k was 6.7 for all classes and 6.8 for the middle classes.
This class was made as broad as it is on the basis of preliminary computations,
which revealed little difference between subclasses within the 25—49 boundary. How-
ever, the negative correction for the 50—54 age class, which on a priori grounds seems
to have the wrong sign, may reflect the upward pull on the ratio for the 25—49 class
of the younger age groups in that class, which in this sample generally seem to have
comparatively high ratios (for what reason is not known).28 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
shown in the bottom row. The pension effect is smaller here than in
Table 4, in which age and income effects were ignored, and according
to the range of error could be as small as zero or as large as 1.2. The
preceding conclusions are therefore confirmed in that covered house-
holds make no net reductions in other forms of saving and in all like-
lihood make a net increase, though it may be less on the average than
one percentage point.
TABLE 6
Corrections for Ratio of Total Other aSavingto Income to Standardize b








1.Under 25 +4.08(±2.5) —
2.25—49 0 0





















Covered Claae +0.6 (±0,6) +0,4 (±0,7)
Note: Figures in parentheses give the range of error at .05 level of
significance; s means correction is significantly different from zero at
that level.
aThatis, excluding contributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
b Estimated by the method of fitting constants, which is equivalent to
fitting a regression equation to the data by least squares. See footnote 5,
al)Ove, and G. Snedecor, StatisticalMethods, Ames,Iowa, 1946, 4th ed.,
pp. 296—299.
CReducedsample of 10,938 (of which 8,027 have pension plans) after
exclusions described in Chapter 2; same as Table 4, bottom two rows
together, except that the nineteen households with extreme pension
saving ratios are included here.
d Reduced sample olE col. 1 with ages under 25 and over 59, and in-
comes less than $4,000 and over 14,999, omitted.
Employed only.Saving Ratios Compared 29
Covered households tend to have higher incomes, and this remains
true within income classes. Any effect produced by income levels might
still distort these 'figures. Yet, while there may be slight distortion,
Appendix Table B, which gives average income and saving for each
income class in Table 6, shows that the higher saving of covered house-
holds within most classes is far more than can possibly be explained
by their higher income. (Possible differences in disposable income are
discussed in Section 5 of this chapter.)
The extreme age and income classes, which have ratios considerably
higher than the middle classes (except for the, lowest income class), do
not greatly affect the over-all results. The analysis for the middle
classes alone, shown in the second column of Table 6, gives a +0.4
pension effect, which is a little lower than for the full sample.
The extreme classes are relatively small in number and for that
reason can be expected to have little effect on estimates for the full
sample. The extreme classes nevertheless save quite differently than
do the middle classes. To determine the difference, it is necessary to
analyze them separately. For this analysis the lowest age and income
classes are excluded because their saving is very likely subject to
special influences and, in any event, they comprise few households.
With their exclusion in addition to the middle classes, there remain
the higher age or income classes excluded from the regression for the
second column of Table 6. Since this remainder covers a small part of
sample, age and income correction factors estimated for it sepa-
rately would be unreliable. We may apply the factors estimated for
the full sample and estimate from this remainder just the standardized
difference between the covered and not-covered groups. Thus com-
puted, the estimate of this difference is 0.6 (±2.0). It is identical to
the estimate for the full sample, suggesting that the pension effect does
not vary with age or income, though the range of error is large because
of the comparatively small numbers on which the estimate is based.
In statistical terms, the equality of these two estimates of the pension
effect suggests that the interaction effects between coverage and age or
income are zero, or at least that this is so as between coverage and
extreme values of age or income. Tabulations (not presented) indicate
that the zero interaction does not result from large effects by age and
income that happen to offset each other.30 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
The absence of an age effect is surprising and important. One might
have expected that older workers would be sensitive to the circum-
stances of their retirement and would respond strongly to changes in
the preparations made for it. On this expectation, today's older workers
would display a sophistication regarding pension plans that tomorrow's
households could be expected to acquire at early ages, most having by
then the benefit of the experience of fathers and uncles who had learned
how the plans work at first hand. Insofar as this sophistication does not
increase the effects of coverage, as the absence of interaction suggests,
these effects on an individual basis will not change over time, and
their strength on an aggregate basis will continue to rise as pension
funds grow, at least in the near future.
One difficulty with these tabulations is that they take no account of
households with more than one income earner. With an extra earner
(typically the wife), the household is more likely to have at least one
member covered by a pension plan. A positive association between the
saving ratio and coverage would then result if a disproportionately
large fraction of the income of extra earners was added to saving (in
anticipation perhaps of large future purchases, or to pay off debts).7
We can easily check on this possibility by segregating our sample by
the number of income earners per household. The results are shown in
Appendix Table C. Most households have one or two income earners;
in this table the few having three or more have been grouped with
those having two. The covered households still have significantly
higher nonpension saving both among households with one earner
and among those with two or more earners.
Another drawback of the adjustment for income level made in the
foregoing tabulations is the use of current actual income instead of
each household's long-run expected or permanent income level. The
two can differ and thereby introduce error into the results because
current income may be temporarily high or low owing to unusual
7 I am indebted to Margaret Reid and Milton Friedman for this point. See W. J.
Bilkey. V. G. Massaro, and J. P. Meehan, Jr., "The Structural Effects on Consumer
Disbursements of Wives Working," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1962,
pp. 221—224, which suggests that working wives produce higher household saving
ratios, at least in the early and middle years. On the other hand, our Consumers
Union sample shows multiple-earner households to have slightly lower saving ratios
(see Appendix Table C).Saving Ratios Compared 31
circumstances, or because current income has yet to reach (or will soon
fall from) the long-run level the household expects during its middle
years or when present training and apprenticeships are completed. In
line with Milton Friedman's permanent income hypothesis,8 house-
holds may be expected to save a large part or all of positive deviations
of current from permanent income and to dissave when confronted
with negative deviations. If so, the ratio of saving to permanent income
gives a better measure of households' normal saving habits, and the
use of current income as a substitute may distort the comparison.
The distortion would be serious here only if the covered and not-
covered households differed in the prevalence of these deviations from
permanent income. Since this might occur by accident, we should test
for it. Although we have no estimate of permanent income levels, we
can adjust for one of the causes of such deviations—transitory changes
in income level. This is done in Appendix D by excluding all house-
holds that reported a temporary rise or fall in income. The results are
essentially the same as in Table 4, which did not make these exclusions,
suggesting that the drawbacks of current income as a proxy for perma-
nent income have not affected the comparison.
Excluding households with transitory changes in income, of course,
takes no account of unfortuitous deviations from the long-run expected
level. Such deviations would occur particularly among young persons
with advanced education, who must put off the full rewards of pro-
fessional standing during long periods of training and apprenticeship.
This is typically true of doctors, most of whom we exclude in omitting
the self-employed. But it is equally true of salaried engineers and other
college graduates, whom our sample includes. These people know that
in the early years their current income will be far short of the levels
to be attained later, but they would not report the early deficiency as
a "transitory fall"; a steady rise in their income level is fully expected
and cannot be viewed as transitory up or down. If such groups were
represented unequally among the covered and not-covered households,
the preceding results would be distorted. Grouping by education and
occupation will eliminate most of this bias.
8ATheory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press for NBER,
1957.32 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
3. Adjustment for Education and Occupation
Our sample has a high proportion of teachers and government work-
ers—special occupational groups that may have atypical saving habits.
The sample isalso heavily weighted with college graduates, who
appear to have higher saving ratios than less-educated workers, as
suggested by this study and others. If the covered and not-covered
groups were represented differently among occupations and educa-
tional levels, the comparison would be distorted. Also, a breakdown by
occupation, as already suggested, brings together households likely to
experience similar patterns of lifetime income and so eliminates some
of the bias from using actual rather than long-run expected income
levels.
The choice of specific occupations for classification was largely dic-
tated by the special character of the sample. The first step was to
segregate salaried workers from wage earners, because, even aside from
differences in relative income level, the two groups differ in the stabil-
ity of their income over time and perhaps also in general attitudes
toward saving; this is the traditional distinction between white- and
blue-collar workers. The next step was to segregate the salaried em-
ployees of educational (including religious and social service)insti-
tutions and of the government, which constitute a substantial part of
the sample and conceivably have saving habits not representative of
the average American household. After these groupings, the remainder
of the sample consisted of one large class covering manufacturing,
trade, transportation, and finance and several small related classes.
They were left as an all-inclusive "business" group. The latter includes
salaried workers in all types of business firms, employees on commis-
sion, salaried workers in agriculture, and a small number of respond-
ents who work for labor unions. A small number of salaried workers
in manual jobs were omitted for want of clear evidence whether they
were appropriately designated white- or blue-collar workers. All wage
earners, on the other hand, appear to be production workers or the like
in business firms. This group was relatively small, in part because it
9Clergyand social service were grouped together as a category on the question.
naire, but had so few households here (see Appendix Table E) that they were in-
cluded for analysis with teachers, which seemed to be the most similar occupation
for our purposes.Saving Ratios Compared 33
is unrepresentative of Consumers Union subscribers and in part per-
haps because many people tend, if in doubt about the question's mean-
ing, to upgrade themselves in the occupational hierarchy.
Occupation is closely associated with educational level, and differ-
ences in saving behavior among occupational groups may partly reflect
differences in education, and vice versa. It is desirable to classify by
both characteristics. Question 3 elicited the educational attainment of
the head of each household in terms of four levels: high school attended
or completed, college attended, four-year college completed, and grad-
uate school attended or completed. The last two groups were combined,
since preliminary tabulations showed that they had nearly the same
average saving ratios.
The cross classification is presented in Table 7, in which some cells
involved small numbers and were omitted. The table shows higher
saving by the covered groups, though most of the differences are not
statistically significant. The preponderance of positive differences is
significant, however, as shown by the sum of the differences at the foot
of the table. Hence this classification of the data reaffirms the previous
findings.
Comparing the various groups, it is seen that, aside from coverage,
the higher educational groups save more; that among occupational
groups, business and government have larger savers than the educa-
tion, clergy, social service group; and that in this company the wage
earners are the smallest savers. Indeed, the very low saving ratio for
the not-covered wage earners produces the two largest differences in
the table between the covered and not-covered housholds. Much of the
variation in the saving ratio between educational and occupational
groups is probably not statistically significant, and so too much should
not be made of it. Nevertheless, it does conform to the results one finds
in classifications by income: this and other cross-sectional evidence sug-
gests that higher saving ratios go with higher income, more education,
and a professional or salaried occupational status; however, it is diffi-
cult to disentangle cause and effect among the three variables.b0 The
10Wemay note in passing that the effects of these variables imply a secular rise
in the aggregate saving ratio, unless a household's relative rather than its absolute
standing in the population is important; whereas, in fact, the secular trend appears
to be flat. The reason might be that these cross-sectional differences are too small34 Effectof Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
TABLE 7
Average Ratios of Total Other aSavingto Income of Covered and Not-






















Business 8.8 8.3 0,5 (±1,6)
Government 7.9 6.8 1.2 (±5.1)




Government 8.6 9.7 —1.1 (±3.0)
Education, clergy, .
social service 7.7 6.0 1.7 (±1.7)
Sum ofdifferences for
all groups above — — 8.6 (±7.9)
Note: Figures in parentheses give the range of error at the .05 level of
significance; s means significantly different from zero at that level.
a That is, excluding contributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
bSameexclusions as for Table 6 (see note c of that table) as well as
households in groups not listed above. Numbers of households in covered
and not-covered groups respectively:1st row, 476 and 264; 2nd row, 447
and 259; 3rd row, 890 and 497; 4th row, 373 and 31; 5th row, 222 and 140;
6th row, 2,314 and 1,008; 7th row, 940 and 85; 8th row, 1,334 and 319.
Education, clergy, and social service are not shown in the first two edu-
cational groups, government is not shown in the first group, and wage
earners are not shown in the last group because the number of households
was too small to make the comparison worthwhile.
ci May not exactly equal the difference between the ratios shown because
of rounding.Saving Ratios Compared 35
saving pattern among cells in the table therefore appears to be rep-
resentative of the nation's population, and the observed difference
between the covered and not-covered groups seems to have general
applicability.
To check for the effect of differences in income, let us examine the
average level of income and saving for each educational and occupa-
tional group (Appendix Table F). Covered households tend to have
higher incomes, as was to be expected. But the differences are too small
to explain the differences in saving: in most cells the higher average
saving of the covered over the not-covered group is much more than
can be explained by the slight difference in income.
The figures in Table 7 are consistent with the possibility (alluded to
in Chapter 2) that the economic recession during the survey period
might have raised the saving ratios of the covered more than the not-
covered households and that the differential rise would have been
sharpest for wage earners. This explanation is based on the greater
insecurity of certain jobs during recessions and so is not likely to
account for the positive differences for the government and education,
clergy, and social service groups, but it might apply to the business
employees and wage earners, and so account for the observed absence
of reductions in the other saving of covered households. We may con-
sider this possibility better from a breakdown of households by the
cyclical sensitivity of the industry in which they were employed. Ap-
pendix Table E presents a rough classification of this kind and shows
that covered households still save more by an amount consistent with
the other comparisons. Distortions produced by the particular time
period in which the survey was conducted, therefore, appear to have
been negligible.
4. Ratio of Wealth to Income
One difficulty with these results is that they may reflect merely a tend-
ency for households with high propensities to save to gravitate toward
jobs offering pension plans. Since they segregate covered and not-
to affect the secular trend or that they change their direction of influence at high
levels so far achieved by only part of the population. The proper interpretation of
these differences is not relevant to this study and need not be pursued here.36 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
covered households, the preceding tables may not, asisimplicitly
assumed, compare households having equal propensities to save; they
may thus be misleading in regard to the effect of coverage. Although
few people are likely to select their job primarily on the basis of its
pension benefits, since there are other aspects of employment many
times more important, one cannot dismiss this possibility altogether.
If a small fraction of workers who were above-average savers preferred
jobs with pension plans, they could produce the results observed.
Workers who seek employment with large corporations offering pen-
sion plans may do so to satisfy a desire for security and so may tend to
save more; this is consistent with the data, but invalidates the previous
interpretation. On the other hand, such workers may achieve the
sought-after security when employed by large corporations, in part
because pensions are offered, and so may tend to save less; this seems
to conflict with our data, however. Or there may be other differences
between the covered and not-covered groups that affect their saving
and distort the comparison.
One slight piece of evidence already presented, however, denies a
job-selection process at work in the sample. In Section 2, above, it
appeared that coverage and age do not interact; that is, the difference
in average saving ratios between covered and not-covered households
was the same for the older age classes as for all. This finding is relevant
because the selection process described above should affect the younger
households most. Pension plans have spread rapidly since World War
II, and new workers entering the labor force over the past decade had
a good opportunity to take jobs with pension plans if they wished.
An older worker who wanted a pension plan but whose employer had
not started one could, of course, have changed jobs. However, since
mobility is much lower among older than younger workers, the latter
should show the higher association between coverage and propensity
to save. Not finding such differences among age classes suggests that
this selection process is weak or nonexistent.
Further evidence against the job-selection explanation was provided
by Table 4. There a positive relation was found between discretionary
saving and the reported amount of contribution to pensions within the
covered group by itself. Such a relation cannot be explained by the
job-selection hypothesis. Yet, though this relation implies an effect thatSaving Ratios Compared 37
varies with the amount of contribution, the importance of coverage
itself cannot be inferred directly. Moreover, if one placed great im-
portance on differing individual propensities to save, he might contend
that this observed relation is spurious: it could be that covered house-
holds with a high propensity to save were for that reason more aware
of their own and their employers' contributions and reported them in
fulL Households having weaker saving propensities may have for-
gotten to report or underreported their own pension contributions
and omitted their employers'. In that way the observed relation could
be produced with no implication that a higher contribution increases
other saving. This possibility appears to be remote; still, the mere fact
that it is a possibility appeals for other evidence to clarify the question.
Another test of whether there are extraneous differences between the
covered and not-covered groups in the sample can be made by using
data on total wealth, which the second survey elicited. Wealth reflects
past saving; since we also know the number of years each household
has been covered by a plan (question l5C), and hence from the age of
its head the number of years not covered, we can by regression methods
estimate for a group of previously covered households their average
saving for years covered and for years not covered.h1 Since these
mates are based on the group covered at the time of the survey, a
comparison with the not-covered group is avoided. In addition, esti-
mates of saving based on wealth pertain to many years and thus sup-
plement from independent evidence the previous estimates based on
one particular year.
Equity in pension plans (as well as retirement benefits under social
security) is excluded from total wealth to give total other wealth, which
is comparable to total other saving used in the foregoing sections. It is
(see question 13) the addition of:
Checking accounts
Saving accounts and government bonds
Common stock and mutual funds (current market value)
Other marketable securities
ii A problem here and elsewhere that we have neglected is that, in covered house-
holds with two or more income earners, the head may not be the one with a pension
plan. Because of the way the questionnaire was worded, there is little we can do
about this problem other than hope it is not serious.38 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
Market value of home
Equity in annuities and life insurance (cash surrender value)
Other assets (specify) 12
minus
Mortgage on home
Other personal debt (instalment, etc.)
Respondents checked one of the following boxes for each item: don't
have, under $500, $500—1,000, $l,000—2,000, $2,000—5,000, $5,000—
10,000, $10,000—20,000,$20,000—40,000, and, if over $40,000, wrote in
the amount. The midpoints of the checked boxes or the amount
written in were added (or subtracted for debt) to get the total.
Any figures that purport to measure wealth undoubtedly contain
gross errors. Although the sample comprised respondents above aver-
age in willingness to be careful and accurate, the question on wealth
surely taxed the patience and understanding of even the most con-
scientious of them. The wording of the items was cryptic and ambigu-
ous (from the necessity to avoid long and complicated questions). On
the brighter side, one item particularly hard to answer—equity in pen-
sion plans—was not used. Errors of reporting the other items enlarge
the variance of total wealth, but do not seem to bias the estimates we
want to derive. Using midpoints probably biases the total downward,
but this, too, seems unimportant for our purposes.
The most serious difficulty is that wealth is acquired in two ways.
In addition to saving out of income, it reflects gifts, capital gains, and
inheritances. We can still measure past saving with reasonable accuracy
if the fraction of wealth acquired the second way is relatively low and
distributed at random among households. Because of these nonsaving
additions to wealth, estimates of saving derived from wealth will be
inexact, but estimates from large samples should still be relevant and
useful.
To make comparisons with the saving ratios used previously, the
ratio of wealth to income was computed. A wealth-income ratio of 1.0,
for example, implies average saving for ten working years of 10 per
12Realestate, business assets, and personal items (the latter omitted if over $5,000).
This category is minor and, though excluded by our preceding concept of saving,
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cent, or for twenty working years of 5 per cent, of the latest year's
income. As is discussed further later, this may understate an average
of past saving ratios if income, as it usually does, rises with age. (Of
course, wealth contributes to current income through interest earnings,
but the contribution is much smaller than wages or salary for most
employed households.) Average wealth ratios are presented in Table 8
by age group and by years covered under a plan. To avoid the distor-
tion of extreme ratios, seventy-two households with ratios of 10 or
greater were arbitrarily excluded.
TABLE 8
Average Ratios of Total Other aWealthto Income by Age Group and
Period Under a Pension Plan b
Not
Years Covered Undera PensionPlan
Less 5to 10 to 15 and













30—34 1.4 1.2 1,3 1.6 1.5
35—39 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.8
40—44 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.]. 2.1
45—49 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.5
50—54 2.7 2.3 3.0 2.8 2.9













All agegroups 1,8 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.6
a Thatis, excluding equity in group pension plans.
bSameexclusions as for Table 6 (see note c to that table) as well as
questionnaires deficient in information on wealth and years covered or
having wealth-income ratios of 10.0 or greater. Number ofhouseholds
in bottom row: 1st col., 2,824; 2nd col., 2,932; 3rd col., 2,016; 4th col.,
1,387; 5th col., 1,472.
CNohouseholds in cell.
ciApparentlyinvolves error in reporting length of coverage. The
number of households is too small to affect the results.
Employed only.
In comparing the rows, one first notices that the not-covered group
has higher wealth ratios on the average than the households covered
less than ten years. The difference for all age groups is statistically40 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
significant for the not-covered and covered-less-than-five-years groups
at the .05 level, but not the not-covered and covered-less-than-ten-years
groups. One might infer that the higher wealth ratio for the not-
covered than for the recently covered households reflects greater past
saving by the former, but this is not consistent with the rest of the
table. Among the covered groups, a higher wealth ratio is generally
associated with longer coverage, thus suggesting greater saving when
covered than when not. A possible explanation of the higher average
ratio for the not-covered than for the recently covered households is
that the former inherited more, though why they did is not clear.'3
The not-covered group aside, we can estimate the effect of coverage
from the covered group alone. While the covered households seem to
differ from the not-covered group in the amount of inherited wealth,
they are less likely to differ in this way greatly or systematically among
themselves. All we need toassume is that the age at which households
covered at the time of the survey acquired their plans in the past was
not related to their propensity to save; that is, that households with
higher propensities to save did not systematically become covered at
younger ages. This assumption can be tested by comparing the current
saving ratios of households covered for different lengths of time; the
comparison is made in Chapter 4, Section 3, and shows no tendency
for longer periods of coverage to be associated with higher saving
ratios.14 On this basis Table 8 shows that, within age groups, the wealth
ratio rises on the whole with length of coverage, which implies that
households saved more when they were covered than when not.
13Onereason could be that income in preceding years rose faster for the covered
group, which would make past saving lower and the ratio of accumulated wealth to
present income lower. This was likely to have been true for government workers and
teachers, most of whom were under pension plans. I am indebted to Robert J.
Landry for this point.
Another reason might be that the not-covered group includes many people who
have great wealth invested in their own business, but who draw regular salaries and
were not classified as self-employed, such as, perhaps, owners of automobile dis-
tributorships or other independent businessmen who said most of their income came
from salary. None of them is likely to be covered by group pension plans. A small
number of such people who had wealth-income ratios less than 10 and so were not
excluded might raise the average wealth ratio substantially, but the average saving
ratio very little.
14Thiscomparison does not hold age constant, but it is not invalid for that reason.
In so far as age and length of coverage are correlated (positively), the saving ratio
would tend to rise with length of coverage owing to the effect of age, which therefore
cannot invalidate the inference drawn in the text from these data.Saving Ratios Compared 41
How much more they saved can be estimated by regression methods.15
The wealth ratio of each household at the time of the survey reflects
the initial level in the first year of full-time employment (assume age
22 for all households),1° and the saving ratios, when covered and when
not, increased by the number of years applicable to each. Let W/Y be
the wealth ratio at the time of the survey and (W/Y)22 at age 22. Let
andbe the average saving ratios when the household was covered
and when not, and P0 andthe respective number of years of each.





The same equation can be fitted separately to the not-covered house-
holds, for all of whom P0, of course, is zero.
W/Y is the dependent variable, representing the data underlying
Table 8. (W/Y)22, S0, andare regression coefficients, estimated by
fitting the equation to the data. P0 andare the independent vari-
ables, approximated by the midpoints of the age and years-of-coverage
intervals, If a household was in the 45—49 age group, the head of the
household was taken to be 47 and to have worked 47—22, or 25 years.
If he had been covered 5—9 years,was taken to be 7 years; and
to be 25—.7, or 18 years.17' For the open-end age group, the midpoint was
arbitrarily assumed to be 67; and for the open-end years-covered group,
17 years. To check the possibility that this last midpoint is inaccurate
and distorted the results, computations (not shown) excluded the house-
holds in that interval; these gave virtually the same estimates.
Estimates of the regression coefficients by least squares and their
range of error are presented in Table 9. The saving ratio for the group
covered at the time of the survey is estimated to have increased by 2.1
percentage points when the household acquired a pension plan, statis-
15Themethod followed here wasdescribedin Cagan, "The Use of Wealth to
Compare Households' Average Saving," Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, September 1964, p. 737.
16Estimates(Table 9) of saving ratios from the regression equation are not affected
by the particular starting age chosen; only the constant term of the equation, the
initial wealth ratio, is affected.
17P0andare of course negatively correlated in the sample. The effect of this is
to increase the standard error of the regression coefficients, but not to bias them,
except for the special reasons noted later.42 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
TABLE 9
Regression Estimates of Saving Ratios for Covered and Not-Covered Years from

















Covered .61 (±.08) 8.2 6.2 (±0.4) 2.1 (±0.7)
Not covered .85 (±.l1) —— 6.3 (±0.6) ——
Note: Figures in parentheses give range of error at .05 level of significance (error
for covered period not computed).
a Least-squares estimates using equation in accompanying text and data underlying
Table 8.
bThatis, excluding equity in or contribution to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
CDoesnot exactly equal difference between figures shown in preceding two columns
because of rounding.
tically a highly significant This is a striking confirmation,
using separate data and comparing the same group with itself, of the
earlier results from this sample. The size of the difference is even
larger than found previously, though this may in part reflect bias.
One reason for bias is that the regression ignores any changes in the
saving ratio with age. The estimated increase in saving with coverage
may have an upward bias if the true saving ratio rises with age, as is
likely, and if age and length of time covered are positively correlated.
To that extent the groups covered longer have a higher estimated rate
of saving, partly because they are older and not only because they are
covered. Our estimate ofrelative towill be too
18Iferrors in the measurement of wealth are positively skewed, residual errors
from the regression may not be normally distributed, in which case the estimates of
error are inaccurate.
19IfP =P0+ P + 22 is the age of the head of the household. The regression
equation in the text may then be written:
Y 22+ + —P0)
22+(S0 — +
so thatis the average saving ratio over working years and (S0 — is the extraSaving Ratios Compared 43
Another bias of uncertain direction results from using the latest
year's income to deflate wealth. If income is constant over time, there
is of course no bias. But if income rises over time, as is to be expected,
our estimate of the average past saving ratio is distorted in two ways.
On the one hand, the average ratio is understated simply because the
latest year's income overstates earlier income levels, and. this bias in-
creases as the average covers a longer period of time. On the other
hand, the later ratios in the average are understated less than the
earlier ratios in using the latest year's income. If the true saving ratio
rises with age, this progressively smaller understatement makes our
estimate of the average past ratio rise even more with age than the true
ratio does.2° If this second distortion exceeds the first, the effect is to
saving when covered. Positive correlation between the two "independent" variables
increases the standard error of estimates, but ordinarily does not bias them.
If the true rises with age, however, the assumption of its constancy in the
regression equation transfers part of the rise into a higher estimate of (S0 —
because P0 tends to be high when P is high. The correlation coefficient between P0
and P for Table 9 is .51—not negligible, but not particularly high either.
S.
20Letthe true saving-income ratio of a household for the ith year be Then





where n is the number of working years of the household. Our estimate of this
average is the ratio of wealth to latest year's income divided by n. If all wealth
represents saving during working years, the estimate of present wealth to income is
(2)
It can be shown that the difference between the two is changed as follows by a




1 1 (..L). (3)
Yis constant, this expression is zero. For a monotonically increasing Y, the expres-
sion is positive if isthe same for all i. Otherwise the expression may be positive
S.
or negative, even if bothandare rising.44 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
reinforce that of a rise in the true ratio pointed Out in the preceding
paragraph: our estimate of S0 relative towill be too high to the
extent that age and length of time covered are positively correlated.
An offsetting bias is due to our exclusion of extreme wealth-income
ratios. Since these would be clustered in the older age groups, their
exclusion makes the estimated rate of accumulation of wealth lower,
though this is proper if most extreme ratios involve reporting errors
or otherwise distort the results.
One other possible bias should be mentioned, though its effect can-
not be determined. The regression implicitly assumes that households
with the same length of coverage but different ages at the time of the
survey had more or less the same saving ratios at the same age. Random
variations can be tolerated but not systematic variations. The latter
seem likely to be unimportant, but one deserves mention. Since house-
holds in different age groups had the same age in different years, the
similarity of periods is important. The 65-and-over group was 45—49
in 1938—42, and might have saved more or less then than the present
45—49 group did in the survey year because of differences in the eco-
nomic climate of the two periods.
Whatever the net effect of these various biases, they could not ac-
count for the entire difference between the saving ratios, because Table
8 shows unmistakably that the wealth ratio rises (and hence also the
average saving ratio) with length of coverage within each age group.
(The correlation between age and length of coverage within these
narrow age intervals is bound to be negligible.) We may demonstrate
the rise in the wealth ratio with length of coverage in Table 8 by esti-
mating the extra saving in covered years within each age group. The
estimate is 2.1 per cent per year for all groups combined,2' the same as
estimated in Table 9. Apparently the biases previously discussed cancel
each other.
The estimate of saving for the group not covered at the time of the
survey is about the same as that for the covered group during the years
21Thisis the least-squares estimate ofin the following regression equation:
=S0P0+ a1A1 + +
where the a's are regression coefficients and the A's are dummy variables for each
group,being unity if the household is in the ith age group and zero otherwise.Saving Ratios Compared 45
it was not covered.22 We noted earlier, however, that the not-covered
households have slightly higher wealth ratios over all than the more
recently covered households, which shows up in the regressions as a
larger constant term. This might explain why they save less, since
greater wealth may dampen the desire to save. We can check the im-
portance of this effect by comparing the saving ratios of the covered
and not-covered groups in the same wealth class. Table 10, which makes
TABLE 10
Average Ratios of Total Other a Saving to Income of Covered and
Not-Covered Households bbyTotal Other CWealth
. Average Saving Ratio Difference
Total Other
Wealth






Less than $5,000 5.8 5.7 0.1 (±1.2)
5,000 —9,999 8.1 7.3 0.8 (±1.4)
10,000 — 19,999 9.2 8.7 0.4 (±1.2)
20,000 — 29,999. 10.5 9.4 1.1
30,000 — 39,999 .11.5 10.4 1.1
40,000 — 59,999 12.6 10.8 1.8 (±2.7)
60,000 andover 14.9 12.7 2.2 (±2.9)




Note: Figures in parentheses give range of error at the .05 level of
significance; s means significantly different from zero at that level.
aThatis, excluding contributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
bAllage classes; same exclusions as for Table 6 (see note c to that table)
as well as households for which wealth could not be computed and those
reporting negative total other wealth (more debts than assets). Number of
households: 10,402.
That is, excluding equity in group pensions.
UMaynot exactly equal the difference between the ratios shown because
of rounding.
this comparison, shows that covered households still save more in each
class, and that the differences for all classes together are significant. A
comparable tabulation, using the ratio of wealth to income and ex-
cluding the younger age groups, gives similar results (see Appendix
Table H).
22Bothestimates are too high if the amount of wealth inherited per year rises
withage, though as a general rule this seems doubtful,46 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
We should interpret this table cautiously. Since the saving ratio
appears to rise with wealth, it is tempting to conclude that wealth has
a positive effect on saving. No such conclusion is warranted, however,
because wealth depends on past saving, and greater wealth reflects in
part a higher propensity to save. To analyze the effect of wealth on
saving, one would have to classify by inherited wealth only, or use
some other classification that was independent of the propensity to
save. Ordinarily, the wealth classification is a way of bringing together
households with the same propensity to save as indicated by past sav-
ing, particularly if the ratio of wealth to income is used. The problem
here is that wealth is also affected by differences in saving between
covered and not-covered households: our previous results imply that
the households covered for some time ought to have larger wealth and
higher wealth ratios. One way to avoid this difficulty would be to com-
pare the saving of households in their first year of pension coverage
with not-covered households, both groups stratified by their past saving
ratios as indicated by their previous year's wealth-income ratios. The
sample unfortunately is not large enough to make such a selective com-
parison feasible.
How then should we interpret Table 10, in which covered house-
holds appear to save more compared with not-covered households that
have accumulated the same amount of wealth? If the not-covered
households save less currently but have accumulated the same amount
of wealth, they may have received greater inheritances or have experi-
enced a slower growth of income in preceding years (see footnote 13),
or the greater saving of most covered households may not have lasted
long enough yet to make their wealth perceptibly larger. After all, we
find that their annual nonpension saving is greater by about 1 per cent
of income. Even in ten years this amounts to less than 10 per cent of
income, an insignificant (and likely imperceptible) sum for households
with a wealth-income ratio over 1.5 or 2.
In summary, the higher other saving of the covered households is
associated with their coverage under a pension plan, and apparently
not with any other characteristic that might cause a higher propensity
to save. This conclusion rests on two characteristics of the sample:
within age groups the wealth ratio rises with length of coverage, and
(as is shown later) the saving ratio does not rise with length of cover-Saving Ratios Compared 47
age. These two findings imply that the saving ratio steps permanently
to a higher level when households become covered.
5. Purchases of Consumer Durables
If pension coverage induces a slight increase in other saving, how do
households' budgets accommodate this shift in the disposition of in-
come? Two ways are of interest: the extra saving forces reductions in
either durable goods purchases or in current expenses. It would reduce
both if the deduction of employees' contributions from paychecks wçre
treated like a reduction in wages and accommodated indiscriminately
by an across-the-board cut in all expenditures. But the main impact
might fall on current expenses if funds for durable goods were set aside
first and not disturbed except for large changes in income. Or, alterna-
tively, the stress might be put on durables if their purchase depended
on the residual funds left over after first taking care of current ex-
penses or if, perhaps, durables were considered substitutes for financial
assets (both being alternative forms of accumulating "capital"). We
may determine the main impact in this sample by comparing the ratio
of other saving, including durable goods purchases, to income for cov-
ered and not-covered households.
Durable goods purchases over the year were estimated from ques-
tions 6, 7, 11, and 12 (see Appendix). The net cash expenditure on cars
purchased in the second six months was written in, but on cars pur-
chased in the first six months it had to be estimated from gross price.
Each other durable purchase was valued at $300 (arbitrarily selected as
the average purchase price). The total of all durable purchases checked
was adjusted for seeming duplication (except for cars, furniture, car-
pets, and hi-fl sets) in cases where the same household checked the same
item on both questionnaires. Except for duplication, it seems more
accurate to estimate these expenditures from two questionnaires each
covering six months than one covering a year, since errors of recall will
multiply as the period covered lengthens. It would have been desirable,
also, to deduct from the value of purchases the depreciation of durable
goods owned dur'ing the year, but this was not done. Because of this
omission and the nature of the data, these estimates of durable goods
purchases are extremely rough and have a large random variability,
though their inclusion in the saving ratios offsets variability otherwise48 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
present that arises from counting increases in consumer instalment debt
as negative saving. The net observed standard error of the ratios is
increased by including these purchases, but not by very much. In any
event, there is no reason for their inclusion to bias a comparison of
covered and not-covered households.
Table 11 presents this comparison of the saving ratio, including and
excluding consumer durables, for a subgroup of the sample. It is the
TABLE 11
Average Saving Ratios,a Including and Excluding Purchases of Consumer





Ratio (per cent) Difference of
Covered over
Not—Covered Not
Durables Covered Covered GroupC
Included 19.0 18.9 0.1 (±0.7)
Excludedd 8.7 7.7 1.18(40.7)
Note: Figures in parentheses give range of error at the .05level of
significance; s means significantly different from zero at that level.
Excluding contributions to group pension plans and social security
taxes.
bForboth rows of table, reduced sample of 7,541 covered households
and 2,708 not covered, after excluding self- and not-employed, incomplete
questionnaires on durables purchases, and households with unusual gains
or losses over $1,000 or with saving (including purchases of consumer
durables) greater than 64 per cent or less than —49 per cent of income.
CMaynot exactly equal difference between the ratios shown because of
rounding.
dDiffersfrom Table 4, bottom two rows, only because of exclusion of
questionnaires with no information on durable purchases and of inclusion
of some households previously excluded for extreme saving ratios.
same reduced sample used for the preceding tables except that the
upper cutoff point for extreme saving ratios (including durables) was
put at 64 per cent instead of 49 as before, in order to allow for an
average rise in the ratios of fifteen points because of including pur-
chases of durables. (Actually this was an overgenerous allowance, since
the average ratio for the full sample rose only about ten points.) The
lower cutoff point of —49 per cent was not changed. After this increase
of the upper cutoff point, the size of the sample was about the same
as before; the necessity of excluding questionnaires with incompleteSaving Ratios Compared 49
answers to the questions on purchases, however, reduced the size by
about a quarter. This reduction leaves the average difference in saving
ratios (excluding durables) between covered and not-covered house-
holds nearly the same as in Table 4.
A comparison of the ratios in the table shows that the increase pre-
viously noted in discretionary saving from pension coverage comes
mostly out of expenditures on consumer durables rather than current
expenses. The average saving ratio, including durables, is virtually the
same for covered and not-covered households, but if durables are ex-
cluded it is slightly and significantly higher for the former. Appendix
Table I, which standardizes the ratios for age and income and is com-
parable to Table 6, except for the inclusion in saving of durables pur-
chases, also shows virtually no effect of coverage on saving.
How then do covered households' budgets accommodate the increase
in other financial saving and their own pension contributions? The
increase in other financial saving does not show up when combined
with durables purchases; hence the increase occurs at the expense of
durables expenditures. The cut in the durables budget, to be sure, is
relatively small: the average increase in discretionary saving is less than
1 per cent of income and purchases of durables are about 10 per cent,
so that on the average they are cut by less than a tenth. Pension con-
tributions out of take-home pay, however, do not decrease the saving
plus durables purchases of covered households; hence these contribu-
tions occur at the expense of nondurables expenditures—current ex-
penses. It is as though funds to buy durables were budgeted and set
aside first, and current expenses were accommodated to whatever then
remained of disposable income less the deduction for the pension con-
tribution. There is a clear difference, therefore, in accommodating
household budgets to pension contributions, on the one hand, and to
the increase in other financial saving, on the other, for what reason is
not apparent.
This outline of household budgeting clears away an objection that
might be made to our findings. Covered households, being less mobile,
are more likely to be homeowners and to have larger families, as indeed
is borne out by our sample (see Appendix Table J). Homes and chil-
dren usually lead to less discretionary saving via cash and securities
and to more saving via mortgage payments, insurance, and household50 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
durables. Yet we observe almost just the opposite: covered households
in our sample have more discretionary saving and purchase fewer
durables, though they do increase other contractual saving minutely
(see Table 4). Differences between the covered and not-covered house-
holds in size and homeownership appear to be too small to eliminate
the increase in saving we have attributed to pension coverage or to
explain it by differences in income taxes.23
One might interpret these results quite differently as showing that
the observed increase in discretionary saving is an illusion produced by
the method of measuring saving. Saving was initially found by the net
change in financial assets, and any debt incurred by a household in
acquiring a durable good was deducted from its saving. In a real sense,
however, its wealth and saving are not directly affected by this debt,
because if we count consumer instalment debt as a liability, we should
also count the durable good acquired as an asset. By including pur-
chases of durables in saving, we correct such misrepresentations. If not-
covered households purchased the same amount of durables as covered
households, but for some reason bought more on credit (though other-
wise had the same amount of financial saving), their financial saving
ratio would be lower and would account for our results. Such mis-
representations cannot be important in this sample, however, because
increases in debt were small on the average and account at most for
a small part of the difference in discretionary saving.
By the same token, a similar argument about reductions in bank
accounts and government bonds made to purchase durables cannot be
dismissed as unimportant. These accounted for nearly all the difference
in discretionary saving (see footnote 4, above). Many households un-
doubtedly save up bank deposits in anticipation of large expenditures
on consumer durables, and in the year of purchase their discretionary
saving will be abnormally low or even negative. By including such pur-
23 Appendix Table J shows that covered households within most age groups have
0.1 more dependent children on the average and own 6 per cent more homes. The
average covered household, therefore, has an extra income-tax exemption for de•
pendents of (.1 x $600) $60 and for mortgage interest of at most $60 (a $20,000 mort-
gage has interest charges of $1,000 or so per year, and there are 6 per cent extra
homeowners among covered households). The extra exemptions total $120, which
reduces the tax by $30 in the 25 per cent tax bracket. If the saving ratio is 15 per
cent, covered households save $5 per year more on the average because of lower
income taxes, far less than we observe in Appendix Tables B and D.Saving Ratios Compared 51
chases in saving we may obtain a truer picture of their normal saving
habits. By this reasoning Table 11 shows the true effect of pension
coverage—namely, zero substitution.
But this inclusion is not necessarily appropriate for all households
or for this study. One household might buy various consumer durables
and another rent them or substitute other services, and the two would
have quite different saving ratios, including durables; yet both might
undertake the same amount of financial saving. Investment in con-
sumer durables does not, after all, provide funds for retirement or for
businesses to borrow. Such conceptual problems obscure comparisons,
because no hard-and-fast definitions can be drawn. Yet it seems clear
that financial assets are the closest substitute for pension funds. While
the exclusion of durables will admittedly introduce some inaccuracies
into our measure of financial saving, especially if it is meant to repre-
sent "long-run accumulation of wealth," because of the large amount
and relative infrequency of such purchases and the prevalence of bor-
rowing to make them (negative saving), the degree of error is not likely
to be great in a large sample. In any one year some households will be
saving up (or paying off previous borrowings: positive saving) for
purchases and some will be making them; average saving for the group
should be little affected. In a particular year the average could be
pushed one way or the other, of course, but it is hard to believe that
such purchases could occur so much more frequently in the not..covered
group as to account for its statistically significant differences from the
covered group. Consequently, the first interpretation of the results—as
showing that pension contributions deducted from paychecks substi-
tute for current expenses and that the induced rise in discretionary
saving largely comes out of expenditures on consumer durables—seems
much the more plausible one.
6. Summary
We find that saving other than through group pensions is not lower
for covered households as a whole, which might imply that a pension
fund is considered worthless as a substitute for other assets, possibly
because of its illiquidity and, if there is no vesting, its uncertain value
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however, by the slightly higher saving in other forms that coverage
seems to induce. The additional saving appears small and not in all
tests significant at the .05 level, but the evidence, taken as a whole,
suggests that it is not a statistical illusion. It shows up in three separate
sets of data: reported pension saving, nonpension saving of covered and
not-covered households, and past saving as indicated by present wealth.
The analysis of the last set suggests that the results cannot be ascribed
to a higher propensity to save of those households that acquire cover-
age. These three sets of data are independent in the sense that they are
based on answers to different questions, though the respondents were
the same. The possibility of the same bias in the results from all three
sets owing to erroneous or mistaken answers is thereby greatly reduced.
Other possible explanations can also be rejected. Differences be-
tween covered and not-covered households in number of dependents
and homeownership are too small to matter. The large amount of cash
and securities saving in the sample, and its slight increase rather than
decrease in response to coverage, argues against the possibility that
households view pensions as a substitute for other saving and want to
make substitutions but cannot do so because other saving is already
at an irreducible minimum. Households may still view the pension
fund as illiquid, but will hardly see it as worthless.
A suggested reason why premium payments for life insurance seem
to behave in a similar way is the following: "Life insurance is likely to
be a form of saving especially appealing to families who happen to
have a low level of assets relative to income and age as a result of past
events. Thus, high insurance is likely to be associated with abnormally
high saving relative to resources." 24Appliedto pension coverage, this
explanation argues that some households may, because of severe capital
losses, become high savers and in consequence seek jobs offering pen-
sion plans. For some households, therefore, acquiring coverage is the
24F.Modigliani and A. Ando, "The 'Permanent Income' and the 'Life Cycle'
Hypotheses of Saving Behavior: Comparison and Tests," in Consumption and Sav-
ing, II, 161.
Some tabulations of the Consumers Union sample not shown indicate such a
positive relation between premium payments and total saving. To me a more ap-
pealing explanation is simply that life insurance is one item that most high-saving
households want, so that households segregated by the amount of their insurance
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consequence of an increase in the propensity to save. Conceivably, such
an explanation has some validity for insurance saving, but it seems
unsatisfactory for pension saving. For one thing, a comparison of cov-
ered and not-covered households with the same wealth in Table 10
was consistent with our other findings and possibly, though not neces-
sarily, inconsistent with the preceding explanation. The main objection
is simply that group pension coverage cannot be acquired easily like
life insurance. One may have to change jobs, perhaps one's vocation,
to acquire a plan if his present employer does not already offer one,
and it seems highly doubtful that very many people would want group
coverage enough to make such major career changes.
In view of the results in Section 4, above, comparing households
covered different lengths of time, the foregoing explanation can be
made consistent with our results only by assumin.g that some event
raises a person's propensity to save and at the same time causes him to
acquire coverage. It seems more likely that coverage is the initiating
event. The accompanying increase in his other saving may then be
explained in terms of the attitude of people during their working years
toward preparing for retirement. Pension coverage draws attention to
the problems of providing for retirement and goes a long way in help-
ing to solve them. It facilitates the rapidly spreading shift to financial
means of providing for retirement from the older reliance on family,
rental property, and the small family farm or business. But by itself it
is apparently found inadequate; the average household supplements it
by additional accumulations, mostly in bank accounts and government
bonds, at the expense of consumer durables purchases. I shall call this
a "recognition" effect of coverage for want of a better term. This effect
adds to the appearance of security-mindedness that is said to character-
ize the modern age, but, since security-mindedness presumably affects
covered and not-covered households alike, it cannot be a cause of the
recognition effect. I have purposesly avoided the term learning effect,
as misleading, since pension plans do not appear to teach households
much that they did not already know or could not easily find out.
From the various adjustments of the data we may tentatively infer
that the recognition effect is stronger among wage earners than salaried
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population as a whole, with its larger fraction of wage earners than the
Consumers Union sample, ought, based on these results, to reflect the
effects of pension coverage even more strongly. This effect, moreover,
is not likely to disappear for some time, if ever, because the older and
more educated groups that might be expected to apprehend the prob-
lems of old age fully even without the aid of a pension plan, and so to
presage the behavior of the whole population in the future when the
costs and benefits of pension plans are household commonplaces, re-
spond to coverage in the same way and apparently to the same extent
as the rest of the sample.
It does not necessarily follow that the recognition effect is the same
for all households. Although it seems unaffected by age and education,
it could depend on the length of time a household has been covered by
a pension plan (which the tabulations in Section 4 did not test) and
various other characteristics of the plan. These are questions explored
in the next chapter along with other possible differences in behavior
among covered households. The findings of the next chapter are con-
sistent with and extend those just reported.